The principal objective in this paper is to ascertain the extent to which Myers' (1984) Pecking Order Theory (POT) of business financing appears to explain financial structure amongst a panel of 871 manufacturing SMEs legally organised as proprietary companies, taken from the Australian federal government's Business Longitudinal Survey for three financial years from 1995-96 to 1997-98. The research findings reported in the paper provide further substantial empirical evidence broadly suggesting pecking order financing behaviour amongst SMEs. However, the findings also suggest the need for a modified POT that more fully reflects the special circumstances and nuances of SME financing. A full specification for a modified POT of financing for SMEs is proposed as a basis for further inquiry in the area.
• They adapt their target dividend payout ratios to their investment opportunities, although dividends are sticky and target payout ratios are only gradually adjusted to shifts in the extent of valuable investment opportunities.
• Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctuations in profitability and investment opportunities, mean that internally generated cash-flow may be more or less than investment outlays. If it is less, the firm first draws down its cash balance or marketable securities portfolio.
• If external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first. That is, they start with debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then perhaps equity as a last resort. In this story, there is no well-defined target debt-equity mix, because there are two kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and one at the bottom. Each firm's observed debt ratio reflects its cumulative requirements for external finance.
In summary, the POT states that businesses adhere to a hierarchy of financing sources and prefer internal financing when available; and, if external financing is required, debt is preferred over equity.
The principal objective in this paper is to ascertain the extent to which Myers' (1984) POT of business financing appears to explain financial structure amongst a panel of 871 manufacturing SMEs legally organised as proprietary companies. This is made possible by the recent availability of data from the Australian federal government's Business Longitudinal Survey (BLS). The paper proceeds as follows.
After reviewing prior research on the POT as it applies to SMEs, the research method is outlined.
Thereafter, the findings of the research are presented, followed by conclusions arising from this investigation.
Prior Research

Relevance of POT for SMEs
Initially, the POT sought mainly to explain the observed financing practices of large publicly traded corporations. However, it was soon recognised that the theory may also apply to the financing practices of non-publicly traded SMEs that might not have the additional financing alternative of issuing external equity finance. Scherr et al. (1990, p. 10) consider the POT to be an appropriate description of SMEs' financing practices, because the 'Pecking order hypothesis is in keeping with the prior findings that debt is by far the largest source of external finance for small business'. In addition, Holmes and Kent (1991, p. 145) suggest that in SMEs 'managers tend to be the business owners and they do not normally want to dilute their ownership claim'. Thus, the issue of external equity finance, and the consequential dilution of ownership interest, may be further down the pecking order. The theory's application to SMEs implies that external equity finance issues may be inappropriate. In relation to the owner-manager's control over operations and assets, if the POT holds, then internal equity finance will be preferred, because this form of finance does not surrender control. When external financing is required, obtaining debt rather than equity finance is favoured, because this places fewer restrictions on the owner-manager. Norton's (1991, p. 287) support for this application of the POT to SMEs is evident in his assertion that:
. . . contrary to financial theory, factors dealing with bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and information asymmetries play little, if any, major role in affecting capital structure policy. Rather, the . . . financial officers seem to follow a 'pecking order' in financing their firm's needs. Hall et al. (2000, p. 299) argue that the information asymmetry and agency problems arising between owner-managers and outside investors providing external finance which give rise to the POT are 'more likely to arise in dealings with small enterprises because of their "close" nature, i.e. being controlled by one person or a few, related people, and their having fewer disclosure requirements'. Scherr et al. (1993, p. 21) indicate the costs information asymmetry creates are more important for SMEs than for large enterprises, 'making differences in costs between internal equity, debt, and external equity consequently greater.
Therefore, the hierarchical approach should have even more appeal to small firms than to large'. In addition, the theory's assumption that managers act on behalf of existing shareholders is more relevant to SMEs, because of their closely held nature, and because the managers are usually the existing shareholders.
Since the POT is pertinent to both SMEs and large enterprises, the theory may therefore explain the observed differences between SMEs and large enterprises' financial structures. Holmes and Kent (1991, pp. 145-146) explain that the application of the POT to SMEs is constrained by the following two factors:
• Small firms usually do not have the option of issuing additional equity to the public.
• Owner-managers are strongly averse to any dilution of their ownership interest and control (which are normally one and the same). This is in contrast to the managers of large firms who usually only have a limited degree of control and often have limited, if any, ownership interest, and are therefore prepared to recognise a broader range of funding options. Ang (1991) provides an alternative to this constrained POT, proposing a modified pecking order of financing preferences for SMEs. This involves new capital contributions from owners ranking behind internal finance, but in front of debt finance. Ang (1991, p. 9) reasons that the actual equity contributions made by the owner-managers of SMEs are often difficult to measure, because 'There are also implicit equity contributions in the form of reduced or below market pay and overtime. The exact cost of these sources is not well understood'. Cosh and Hughes (1994, p. 33) argue that within an overall POT, SMEs when compared to large enterprises would:
• Rely more on carrying 'excess' liquid assets to meet discontinuities in investment programs.
• Rely more on short-term debt including trade credit and overdrafts.
• Rely less on new shareholders' equity compared to 'internal' equity and to debt in raising new finance.
• Rely to a greater extent on hire purchase and leasing arrangements.
Thus, in relation to SME's debt financing, Cosh and Hughes (1994) propose a refinement of the theory, because of the lack of information to assess risk, both individual and collective, of SMEs. Fama and French (2000, p. 28 ) reveal a blemish in the application of the POT to SMEs in that 'less levered non-payers [of dividends] are more profitable, which is consistent with the pecking order model. But less levered non-payers also have better investments'. Fama and French (2000, p. 28) suggest that 'the spread of investment … and earnings … is higher for less levered non-payers. From the perspective of the simple pecking order model, the low leverage (book and market) of these firms is anomalous'. That is, the lower free cash flows or higher spreads of investment over earnings for enterprises with lower leverage are not consistent with the POT. Fama and French (2000, p. 28 ) go on to reveal that:
The less levered non-payers are typically small growth firms. It is possible that these firms conform to the complex rather than the simple version of the pecking order model; they keep leverage low to have low-risk debt capacity available to finance future growth. But … they seem to achieve this result by violating the pecking order. Specifically, the least levered non-payers make the largest net new issues of stock … (the form of financing most subject to asymmetric information problems), even though they have low risk debt capacity. This is not proper pecking order behavior.
This quotation recognises the possibility of modifying the financing pecking order for growth SMEs. This could be so because of owner-managers' attitudes to the option of raising external equity, and to any dilution of their control. Thus, the theory may explain the observed differences between SME's and growth SME's financial structures.
Research Hypotheses
Having established the potential relevance of the POT for SMEs, it remains in this section of the paper to establish hypotheses which, if not rejected by the findings of this research, would suggest pecking order financing behaviour amongst the Australian manufacturing SMEs in the BLS panel. For space reasons, the expedient is taken here of summarising a growing theoretical and empirical literature as in Table 1. INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE Table 1 first identifies dependent and independent variables deemed relevant and appropriate by the research literature. These receive some comment below. The table then presents the hypothesised sign of the coefficients for the independent variables, mainly as suggested by prior studies that are referenced.
Following the lead of prior research in the area (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Hutchinson et al., 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2000) , three dependent variables representing the main components of financial structure (based on balance sheet book values) are used in this study. That is, the research employs separate variables for short-term and long-term debt ratios, which are then aggregated into a variable for total debt ratio. Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993, p. 59) suggest that 'Estimating separate relations for long and short term debt ratios . . . allows for influences on maturity structure of debt as well as on leverage'. Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993, p. 62 ) go on to conclude that: … the influences encountered in the analyses are far less straightforward than the hypothesized effects in the theory. Most variables influence the maturity structure of debt rather than leverage: the effects on long and short term debt tend to cancel out.
The results of Hutchinson et al. (1998, p. 4) reveal that 'influences on total debt were found to be the net effect of opposite influences on long and short-term debt for some variables'. Thus, using three dependent variables allows research to examine influences on the maturity structure of debt as well as the total debt position of sample SMEs. As Michaelas et al. (1999, p. 119) indicate, 'There is [a] likelihood that leverage related costs of short-term debt may differ from those of long-term debt'. Michaelas et al. (1999, p. 119 ) go on to acknowledge that 'While firms may have separate policies with regard to short-term debt, there is likely to be some interaction between the levels of long-term and short-term borrowing'. Hall et al. (2000, p. 303) argue that 'By examining both long-term and short-term measures of leverage it should be possible to determine whether the factors that influence short-term debt differ from those that determine long-term debt'.
The independent variables for this study identified in Table 1 are generally measured in a conventional manner. However, three of them require some explanation. The metric variable 'Asset structure' is fixed (or non-current or long-term) assets as a percentage of total assets. The categorical variable 'Management/ownership structure' stems from previous research using the same data undertaken by one of the authors (McMahon, forthcoming). In that research, the manufacturing SMEs studied were classified as being either low or high agency cost businesses depending on the complexity of their management/ownership structures and the values of certain proxy measures for equity agency costs.
Finally, the categorical variable 'Willingness to sell equity' reflects recent reported experiences of doing so by the SMEs surveyed. As will be seen, the presentation of findings for this study focuses wholly upon the apparent sign and statistical significance of the coefficients for the chosen independent variables in multivariate modelling of the dependent variables described above.
Research Method
Research Data
The panel data employed in this research are drawn from the Business Longitudinal Survey (BLS) conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) on behalf of the federal government over the four financial years 1994-95 to 1997-98. Costing in excess of $4 million, the BLS was designed to provide information on the growth and performance of Australian employing businesses, and to identify selected economic and structural characteristics of these businesses.
The ABS Business Register was used as the population frame for the survey, with approximately 13,000 business units being selected for inclusion in the 1994-95 mailing of questionnaires. For the 1995- Finally, because a key question requesting information on the proportion of an SME's equity that is held by owner-managers was not asked in the 1994-95 survey, the analysis presented in this paper is confined to data for the 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 financial years only.
Data Analysis
The analytical model for this study, derived from the prior research reviewed earlier, is as illustrated in 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
This model represents profitability, enterprise growth and size, enterprise age, and certain other enterprise characteristics (essentially controls) as likely to influence the financial structure of SMEs. The key study relationship for the model can be represented mathematically as follows:
Equation 1 where F s = financial structure, dependent variables P a = profitability, independent variables G b = enterprise growth, independent variables S c = enterprise size, independent variables A = enterprise age, independent variable C d = other enterprise characteristics, independent (control) variables Thus, it is for the research to ascertain whether such dependencies seem to prevail in the study sample, and infer if they are likely to exist in the population of Australian manufacturing SMEs.
As indicated earlier, three dependent variables representing the main components of financial structure (based on balance sheet book values) are used in this study. That is, the research employs separate variables for short-term and long-term debt ratios, which are then aggregated into a variable for total debt ratio. Some descriptive statistics for these three metric dependent variables are presented in Table 2 .
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE Examination of Table 2 reveals that, in each of the three years of the longitudinal study, the manufacturing SMEs maintained quite high levels of short-term debt to total funding, in the range 37 to 41 per cent. By contrast, long-term debt to total funding is in the range 9 to 13 per cent. Overall, total debt to total funding in the range 63 to 65 per cent reveals that the financial structure of the SMEs examined is clearly debtoriented. The significance values for a series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample tests suggest that these metric dependent variables are far from being normally distributed. Transformation of the variables to produce normal distributions has been avoided because of difficulties of interpretation often created by such procedures. Thus, the three dependent variables have been dichotomised into below-median and above-median categories for modelling purposes.
The independent variables employed in this research, largely suggested by prior research in the area, have already been revealed in Table 1 . For reasons of space, descriptive statistics for the various independent variables are not included in this paper, but they can be provided by the authors on request.
The significance values for a series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample tests suggest that all the metric independent variables are not normally distributed. As with the dependent variables, transformation of the metric independent variables to produce normal distributions has been avoided. A series of associative tests suggests the possibility of multicollinearity between the profitability measures 'Return on total assets' and 'Net margin on sales', and between the enterprise size measures 'Total assets', 'Annual sales' and 'Total employment'. As will become evident, simultaneous use in modelling of multicollinear independent variables has been precluded.
The principal modelling procedure used in this research is logistic regression (also referred to as 'logit analysis'). The main reason for choosing this multivariate technique is the categorical (that is, nonmetric) nature of the dependent variables. As Hair et al. (1995, p. 130 ) point out:
. . . discriminant analysis is also appropriate when the dependent variable is nonmetric. However, logit analysis may be preferred for several reasons. First, discriminant analysis relies on strictly meeting the assumptions of multivariate normality and equal variance-covariance matrices across groups, features not found in all situations. Logit analysis does not face these strict assumptions, thus making its application appropriate in many more situations. Second, even if the assumptions are met, many researchers prefer logit analysis because it is similar to regression with its straightforward statistical tests, ability to incorporate nonlinear effects, and wide range of diagnostics. For these and more technical reasons, logit analysis is equivalent to discriminant analysis and may be more appropriate in certain situations.
The assumptions underlying logistic regression are undemanding and its use with the irregularly distributed (that is, non-normal) data available to the present study is entirely appropriate (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984) .
Further information on logistic regression as a statistical technique is presented in an Appendix to the paper.
Research Findings
Short-Term Debt to Total Funding
The first stage of the multivariate logistic regression modelling undertaken employed a dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether short-term debt to total funding is above or below the median value for this ratio amongst the 871 manufacturing SMEs in the longitudinal panel. Separate modelling was undertaken for each of the three years considered in the study. The year 1997-98 was actually modelled twice -once using simple rates of growth in assets, sales and employment for that year, and once using compound rates of growth in assets, sales and employment over the three years of the study. For any one year, avoiding the joint inclusion of multicollinear independent variables meant producing six models:
• Three models used 'Return on total assets' as the operating profitability measure, and three models used 'Net margin on sales' for this purpose.
• Two models used 'Total assets' as the enterprise size measure, two models used 'Annual sales' for this purpose, and two models used 'Total employment' for this purpose.
Results from this modelling effort, expressed in terms of the apparent sign and statistical significance of the coefficients for the chosen independent variables, are presented in Table 3 .
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Comments below focus upon the shaded independent variables in Table 3 for which there appear to be relatively consistent statistically significant relationships with the dependent variable in a multivariate context.
It would appear from the modelling findings that short-term debt to total funding for the business concerns studied is significantly influenced by:
• Operating profitability as measured by either 'Return on total assets' or 'Net margin on sales'. In both cases the sign of the regression coefficient is negative, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the less profitable an SME is, and therefore the less self-sufficient it is through reinvestment of profits, the more likely it will need to depend upon short-term debt financing for its assets and activities.
• Recent (simple) annual sales growth. The sign of the regression coefficient is positive, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that growth in an SME's sales creates financing pressures that are likely to be met, at least initially, with short-term debt.
• Enterprise size as measured by 'Total assets'. The sign of the regression coefficient is positive, contrary to the hypothesis presented earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the larger an SME is in terms of assets, the more likely it will need to depend upon short-term debt financing for those assets. This would be the case, of course, if limited access to longer-term debt and equity financing arising from an alleged 'finance gap', prevented the business from following the financial management dictum of matching the term of finance used to the term of assets acquired (the so-called 'matching' or 'hedging' principle). It could also be conjectured that SMEs might fall into such circumstances because of ignorance of this dictum or principle.
• Enterprise age. The sign of the regression coefficient is negative, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the younger an SME is, and therefore the less time it has had to become self-sufficient through reinvestment of profits, the more likely it will need to depend upon short-term debt financing for its assets and activities.
• Asset structure measuring fixed (or non-current or long-term) assets as a percentage of total assets.
The sign of the regression coefficient is negative, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the lower the proportion of fixed assets held by an SME, the more likely it will be that it depends upon shortterm debt financing for its assets. This is, of course, in accord with the dictates of the matching or hedging principle.
Overall, then, the findings of this research appear to be consistent with the POT of business financing as regards short-term debt to total funding of the SMEs studied. There does, however, seem to be a suggestion that these businesses may not choose to, or be able to, adhere to the matching or hedging principle with respect to short-term financing of assets.
Long-Term Debt to Total Funding
The second stage of the multivariate logistic regression modelling undertaken employed a dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether long-term debt to total funding is above or below the median value for this ratio amongst the 871 manufacturing SMEs in the longitudinal panel. The extent and pattern of modelling undertaken were similar to those already described for short-term debt to total funding. Results from this modelling effort, expressed in terms of the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients for the chosen independent variables, are presented in Table 4 .
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Comments below focus upon the shaded independent variables in Table 4 for which there appear to be relatively consistent statistically significant relationships with the dependent variable in a multivariate context.
It would appear from the modelling findings that long-term debt to total funding for the business concerns studied is significantly influenced by:
• Operating profitability as measured by 'Return on total assets'. The sign of the regression coefficient is negative, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the less profitable an SME is, and therefore the less self-sufficient it is through reinvestment of profits, the more likely it will need to depend upon longterm debt financing for its assets and activities.
• Enterprise size as measured by 'Total employment'. The sign of the regression coefficient is positive, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the larger an SME is in terms of employment, the more likely it will depend upon long-term debt financing. This would be the case, of course, if access to longer-term debt financing is dictated, to some degree, by the size of the business.
• Enterprise age. The sign of the regression coefficient is negative, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the younger an SME is, and therefore the less time it has had to become self-sufficient through reinvestment of profits, the more likely it will need to depend upon long-term debt financing for its assets and activities.
The sign of the regression coefficient is positive, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the higher the proportion of fixed assets held by an SME, the more likely it will be that it depends upon long-term debt financing for its assets. This is, of course, in accord with the dictates of the matching or hedging principle.
Overall, then, the findings of this research appear to be consistent with the POT of business financing as regards long-term debt to total funding of the SMEs studied.
Total Debt to Total Funding
The final stage of the multivariate logistic regression modelling undertaken employed a dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether total debt to total funding is above or below the median value for this ratio amongst the 871 manufacturing SMEs in the longitudinal panel. The extent and pattern of modelling undertaken were similar to those already described for the previous stages. Results from this modelling effort, expressed in terms of the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients for the chosen independent variables, are presented in Table 5 .
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Comments below focus upon the shaded independent variables in Table 5 for which there appear to be relatively consistent statistically significant relationships with the dependent variable in a multivariate context.
It would appear from the modelling findings that total debt to total funding for the business concerns studied is significantly influenced by:
• Operating profitability as measured by either 'Return on total assets' or 'Net margin on sales'. In both cases the sign of the regression coefficient is negative, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the less profitable an SME is, and therefore the less self-sufficient it is through reinvestment of profits, the more likely it will need to depend upon debt financing of whatever term for its assets and activities.
• Enterprise size as measured by 'Total assets'. The sign of the regression coefficient is positive, contrary to the hypothesis presented earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the larger an SME is in terms of assets, the more likely it will depend upon debt financing of whatever term for those assets. This would be the case, of course, if limited access to equity financing prevented the business from 'balancing' its use of debt and equity as per 'optimal financial structure' theory. It could also be conjectured that SMEs might fall into such circumstances because of so-called 'external equity aversion' amongst their owner-managers, reflecting their reluctance to surrender ownership and control of their businesses to outside parties like venture capitalists, business angels, etc. that might seek equity participation in return for their support.
• Enterprise age. The sign of the regression coefficient is negative, as hypothesised earlier on the basis of prior writing and empirical research on the POT of business financing. The implication is that the younger an SME is, and therefore the less time it has had to become self-sufficient through reinvestment of profits, the more likely it will need to depend upon debt financing of whatever term for its assets and activities.
Overall, then, the findings of this research appear to be consistent with the POT of business financing as regards total debt to total funding of the SMEs studied. There does, however, seem to be a suggestion that these businesses may not choose to, or be able to, adhere to the dictates of optimal financial structure theory in 'balancing' their use of debt and equity financing.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The key findings from this research into the POT and financial structure amongst Australian manufacturing SMEs included in the BLS CURF panel can be summarised as follows:
• There is now further substantial empirical evidence broadly suggesting pecking order financing behaviour amongst SMEs.
• However, there is also further substantial empirical evidence suggesting the need for a modified POT that more fully reflects the special circumstances and nuances of SME financing.
These findings are generally consistent with those of prior studies like those undertaken by Ang (1991), Holmes and Kent (1991) , Cosh and Hughes (1994) , and Fama and French (2000) . The principal modifications to the POT indicated by this body of research arise from such phenomena as below market financial returns often accepted by SME owners and owner-managers, the alleged finance gap faced by SMEs seeking longer-term development capital, the widespread failure of SMEs to follow the dictates of the matching or hedging principle, the common usage of so-called 'quasi-equity' by SMEs, frequent reliance upon financing from family and friends (so called, 'F-connections') of SME owners and ownermanagers, and the recognised prevalence of external equity aversion amongst SME owners and ownermanagers.
On the basis of this and prior empirical research in the field, a full specification for a modified POT of financing for SMEs could appear as follows (from most preferred source of finance to least preferred):
• Reinvestment of profits (fully reflecting 'in-kind' contributions of existing owner-managers such as long working hours and below market salaries).
• Short-term debt financing (beginning with major reliance upon trade credit and including use of personal credit card financing).
• Long-term debt financing (possibly beginning with longer-term loans from existing owners and owner-managers (that is, quasi-equity), and perhaps from their families and friends).
• New equity capital injections from existing owners and owner-managers (perhaps including their families and friends, and fully reflecting acceptance by existing owners and owner-managers of low or zero dividends).
• New equity capital from hitherto uninvolved parties (including new owners and owner-managers, venture capitalists, business angels and Second Board listing).
Note that this proposed POT for SMEs differs from that of Holmes and Kent (1991) in that the possibility of raising new equity capital from hitherto uninvolved parties is included. While Holmes and Kent (1991) heavily discount this alternative, government policy initiatives over the last decade have been moderately successful in improving the institutional framework for external equity raising by principally medium-sized enterprises. Note also that, in contrast to the suggestion of Ang (1991) , new equity capital injections from existing owners and owner-managers, and possibly their families and friends, are included after debt financing. Ang (1991) proposes that this alternative should follow reinvestment of profits and precede debt financing. However, the BLS panel data for manufacturing SMEs reveal that only a small proportion (typically 5 to 10 per cent) of these businesses ever undertake new equity financing, and that debt financing appears to dominate the balance sheets of such concerns. Where new equity finance is raised, it is predominantly (typically in excess of 80 per cent) sourced from existing owners and owner-mangers, and from their families and friends.
Apart from proposing a modified POT for SMEs as a basis for further inquiry in the area, two other recommendations for further research using the BLS data set can be made. The first is the clear need to ascertain the extent to which the POT of business financing (however modified) appears to explain financial structure amongst SMEs in industries other than manufacturing. This could be especially important for less capital intensive industries with more modest financing requirements than manufacturing. The second recommendation is to examine much more closely the rather curious indication from this study that enterprise growth may not be an important influence upon the financial structure of the manufacturing SMEs investigated. Recall that recent annual sales growth seems to significantly influence the short-term debt to total funding ratio in a positive manner; the implication being that growth in an SME's sales creates financing pressures that are likely to be met, at least initially, with short-term debt.
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